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Abstract: There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why 
many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard 
to explain. David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more 
attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why 
we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is 
worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing 
explanation that is more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers 
find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex 
demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their 
application conditions.  
 
1.  Introduction  
In the mid 1990s, Chalmers (1995, 1996) foregrounded a range of questions concerning 
the nature of phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenon of what it’s like to feel or 
consciously experience something. Chalmers popularized questions concerning the 
relationship between physical and phenomenal entities in particular, including, especially, 
the question of whether and how phenomenal properties (such as what it is like to be in a 
state of pain) can be explicated fully in terms of physical properties (such as, taking a well-
worn toy example, the property of neural c-fibers firing). He calls the challenge of providing 
an answer to these kinds of questions the “hard problem of consciousness” (“hard problem”). 
Hundreds of articles and dozens of books have been published in the wake of his work, 
confirming Chalmers’s titular presumption that the problem is a hard one.  
Now, 23 years or so years later, in his article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness,” 
Chalmers (2018) attempts to popularize a new but related range of questions about 
consciousness. The central question is why we think that the hard problem of consciousness 
is such a hard problem, as it seems we do given the sheer volume of publications on the 
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problem. Aptly, Chalmers calls the challenge of explaining why we think the hard problem 
is hard the “meta-problem of consciousness” (“meta-problem”).2  
Chalmers doesn’t aim to introduce the meta-problem. As he notes, that ship arguably 
sailed in the 17th century with Hobbes and Hume at the helm, among others. Nor is his 
goal to even defend a particular solution to the problem, though one of the major 
contributions of his article is an extensive, opinionated guide as to which solutions might 
be more promising than others. Rather, Chalmers’s main goal is to organize much of the 
discussion on the topic and chart some paths for future inquiry, such that other researchers 
might end up in a position to work on the many issues that the meta-problem brings out 
even more profitably. We find ourselves, the authors of this reply, in that very position. 
Thus, Chalmers’s intervention in the debate is already something of a success. 
Nevertheless, we find Chalmers’s discussion of one such solution to the meta-problem 
wanting. Our main goal in this reply is to defend a version of this solution. The rest of the 
paper’s first half adds to Chalmers’s case that the meta-problem is worthy of attention. In 
the second half, we defend a version of what Chalmers calls, following many others, the 
“phenomenal concept strategy”. According to it, a special feature of the concepts involved in 
thinking about consciousness explains why we think that the hard problem is hard. The 
version we develop takes inspiration from Nagel (2000) and Levin's (2007) twist on an 
influential version of the strategy, found in Loar (1997), among others.3 Our defense has 
two prongs. The first involves developing a worry for our preferred view that is inspired by 
Chalmers, but ultimately showing that there are responses to it available. The second 
involves illustrating how the version of the phenomenal concept strategy that we float 
explains much that needs explaining.  
 
2. The Meta-Problem, What 
Try to suppose that the experience of being in pain can be understood entirely in terms of 
c-fibers firing in the brain. You might have a hard go of it. But, if so, you also wouldn’t be 
alone. Phenomenal properties appear to many researchers to escape full explication in terms 
of non-phenomenal properties, including, especially, physical properties. It appears to 
 
2 Laskowski (2019, 2020) draws attention to a seemingly analogous meta-problem in metaethics 
concerning why researchers find it so hard to believe that normative properties could be explained 
in terms of natural properties.  
3 See Diaz-Leon (2016), Elpidorou (2017), Schroer (2010) and Veillet (2015) for related ideas 
developed more recently. While these philosopher’s views of phenomenal concepts resemble our 
own in some ways, there have not yet been any explicit and sustained attempts to show that such 
views can solve the meta-problem. Diaz-Leon (2020) comes closest, but appears in the end to offer 
a different kind of solution than our own. 
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many researchers that the experience of being in pain cannot be identified with or, more 
generally, metaphysically “reduced” to the physical property of being c-fibers firing in the 
brain. That so many researchers doubt the reduction calls out for explanation. Chalmers 
calls the judgment that phenomenal properties are irreducible in this sense the 
“explanatory” or “metaphysical” intuition.4 He says that explaining such a “problem 
intuition” is part of the meta-problem. One of our main goals is to explain why we have 
the explanatory or metaphysical intuition. 
While explaining the explanatory or metaphysical intuition seems part of the meta-
problem, Chalmers also says it’s not the only part. Another set of “problem intuitions”, 
which Chalmers calls our “modal intuitions”, include judgments about the conceivability 
of various scenarios involving consciousness. We’ll now present an account of phenomenal 
concepts that explains some of our modal intuitions, which we will subsequently use to 
mount an account of the explanatory or metaphysical intuition. 
 
3. Explaining Modal Intuitions 
Distinguish positive modal intuitions from negative modal intuitions. The former are 
positive because they involve meta-problematically conceivable possibilities, such as "zombie 
worlds", worlds physically indiscernible from our own but where no phenomenal properties 
are instantiated. The latter are negative because they involve meta-problematically 
inconceivable possibilities, like the a priori knowable fact that, necessarily, kicking a rock 
doesn’t cause it pain.5 How can we explain such intuitions? 
Proponents of the influential phenomenal concept strategy do so using claims about the 
concepts through which we conceive of scenarios involving phenomenal properties 
(“phenomenal concepts”). Their distinctive claim is that our modal intuitions arise from 
features of the concepts involved in phenomenal thought, not from features of the 
phenomenal properties to which the question of reduction applies. For example, 
phenomenal concept strategists like Loar (1997) suggest that the alleged demonstrativity of 
phenomenal concepts like PAIN explains our positive modal intuitions, like the 
conceivability of zombie worlds.6 That is, using PAIN to think about the painfulness of 
stubbing one’s toe is thinking of pain through the demonstrative concept THAT (MENTALLY 
OSTENDING INWARDS). Loar appeals to demonstratives like THAT and THIS because they 
 
4 We don’t think there’s much daylight between “explanatory” and “metaphysical” intuitions, nor 
does Chalmers, it seems, as he characterizes the two as “related”. Chalmers (2018, 12) Also, all 
citations of Chalmers are to be understood as references to his symposium contribution unless 
otherwise noted.  
5 See Yablo (2008) Chapter 5 
6 Words in capital letters denote concepts. 
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have few if any analytic or otherwise a priori connections to other concepts. After all, 
demonstratives’ meanings are flexible enough to denote any object whatsoever, or very 
nearly so. In particular, demonstrative concepts lack a priori connections to physical 
concepts; nothing about the physical follows a priori from thoughts involving 
demonstrative concepts like THAT or THIS. We’ll coin a term for this feature: 
demonstrative concepts like THAT and THIS lack “physical-descriptive content”.  
Since demonstrative concepts like THAT lack physical-descriptive content, we can, 
without any rational failing, use our physical concepts to conceive of a world that is 
physically identical to ours (e.g., where a toe is stubbed and c-fibers fire) without thereby 
deploying the corresponding demonstrative-phenomenal concepts to conceive of the 
phenomenal upshots of that physical conception (e.g. where pain is experienced upon such 
stubbing). Because this account proposes to explain a modal intuition using features of 
concepts like PAIN, such as their alleged demonstrativity, rather than features of properties 
like pain, it is a version of the phenomenal concept strategy. 
Chalmers discusses this strategy as a potential solution to the meta-problem, under the 
heading of “phenomenal concepts” (21). In particular, he also discusses the version of the 
phenomenal concept strategy that we used above, calling it an “indexical” view.7 According 
to Chalmers, such views are “too ‘thin’” to explain the problem intuitions constitutive of 
the meta-problem (22). In particular, he says, “when we pick out a state indexically as ‘this 
state’, we are silent on its nature and there is no obvious reason why it should generate 
problem intuitions.” Chalmers doesn’t say why he thinks that such a view fails to explain 
our problem intuitions.8 His discussion is unfortunately brief, though understandably so 
given his overarching goals. Nevertheless, we think there’s an interesting way to sharpen 
Chalmers’s “thinness” complaint about explaining modal intuitions using demonstrative, 
phenomenal concepts. 
Concepts like THIS generally lack descriptive content, and so lack physical-descriptive 
content in particular. This feature allows phenomenal concept strategists to explain positive 
modal intuitions like the conceivability of zombies. However, it also appears to prevent 
such concepts from being able to explain other facets of the problem, like negative modal 
intuitions. Just as zombie worlds are conceivable, worlds where rocks physically identical 
to our own feel pain when kicked by Johnson in apocryphal refutations of Berkeley are 
inconceivable. But if PAIN wholly lacks physical-descriptive content, then agonized rocks 
 
7 Chalmers uses “indexical” as a label for views on which phenomenal concepts are demonstratives. 
But he doesn’t use this label for Loar’s view, which is one on which phenomenal concepts are also a 
kind of demonstrative concept. Chalmers is following the literature in this regard, but it’s worth 
noting that the literature is in this and various others ways misleading.    
8 To be fair, Chalmers appeals to earlier work of his as providing further evidence against the view. 
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should be conceivable. After all, we’re supposing that PAIN lacks physical-descriptive 
content - that’s Chalmers's “thinness” complaint. If it lacks such content, we should be able 
to conceive of objects in pain whatever their physical makeup. But we cannot conceive of 
agonized rocks, plausibly owing to their physical makeup. So, PAIN has more physical-
descriptive content than THAT.9 
Framing this Chalmers-inspired, “thinness” complaint in these terms foregrounds the 
response on behalf of the phenomenal concept strategy that we wish to develop. The 
complaint is that concepts like THAT lack enough physical-descriptive content to mount 
a promising explanation of all of our modal intuitions. We agree. But THAT is a simple 
demonstrative and its lack of physical-descriptive content originates in its simplicity not its 
demonstrativity, whereas what’s essential to the phenomenal concept strategy described 
above is essentially demonstrative, not essentially simple.  
Consider, then, another version of the phenomenal concept strategy—one that appeals 
to complex demonstrative expressions (e.g., "that biological state"). Such an expression 
plausibly has physical-descriptive content, such as BIOLOGICAL.10 Were PAIN to 
consist in THAT BIOLOGICAL STATE, a simple explanation is possible of why 
painless-zombie duplicates of ourselves are conceivable and agonized duplicates of rocks 
are not: rocks do not instantiate biological states. Chalmers’s complaint reveals that 
phenomenal concept strategists must attribute a “Goldilocks” level of physical-descriptive 
content to phenomenal concepts: not too little, so that agonized rocks are inconceivable, 
and not too much, so that zombies are conceivable.  
Complex demonstratives suggest a model for how this additional content is encoded 
at the level of phenomenal concepts. Because complex demonstratives are demonstrative, 
they encode comparatively little information. However, because they are complex, they 
encode at least some. A version of the phenomenal concept strategy on which phenomenal 
concepts are complex demonstrative concepts, rather than simple demonstrative concepts, 
looks like it can explain our modal intuitions. Such a view promises to explain part of the 
meta-problem. 
It seems to us, then, that the phenomenal concept strategy has more going for it than 
Chalmers’s discussion suggests, at least with respect to explaining some aspects of the meta-
 
9 Anecdotally, while many people with whom we have discussed these ideas agree with us that rocks 
experiencing agony is inconceivable, some have said otherwise, pointing to cartoons in which (say) 
rocks wince and cry out as evidence against our claim. We’re skeptical that such depictions constitute 
evidence for the conceivability of rocks experiencing anything, but we see little to be gained from 
intuition mongering. Nevertheless, we think a conditionalized statement of our conclusion would 
still be of interest.    
10 This kind of view is suggested in Nagel (2000) and Levin (2007). 
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problem.11 This isn’t to say that “going complex-demonstrative” is a panacea for problems 
with the phenomenal concept strategy. Proponents of such a view must confront a host of 
tricky issues. For example, both "spiky-haired boy" and "skateboards" denote attributes of 
Bart Simpson. But the adjectives behave differently in the sentence "that spiky-haired boy 
skateboards". If Bart Simpson failed to skateboard, the sentence would be false. But if he 
failed to have spiky hair or were he a girl, things are much less clear. Would the sentence 
fail to refer or fail to meet a presupposition, and so lack a truth-condition, Strawson-style? 
Is the role of "spiky-haired boy" simply heuristic, helping us to identify the intended 
referent of "that", and so makes no difference to the sentence’s truth-conditions?  
If the latter, then "that spiky-haired boy skateboards" and "that skateboards" express 
precisely the same content under appropriate conditions, which is bad news for complex 
phenomenal concept strategists hoping to answer Chalmers’s complaint. For if the 
contribution of "spiky-haired boy" isn’t manifest in the content expressed by "that spiky-
haired boy skateboards", then complex demonstratives’ complexity isn’t manifest in 
thought, particularly in thought employing phenomenal concepts.12 And if demonstrative 
concepts don’t manifest complexity, then “going complex demonstrative” won’t help with 
worries about their "thinness". We raise this worry not to suggest that it can’t be met, but 
rather to illustrate that the benefits of explaining our modal intuitions using a complex 
demonstrative version of the phenomenal concept strategy don’t come for free.  
Nevertheless, we think that the complex view is promising enough to make addressing 
these difficulties worthwhile. For in addition to explaining our modal intuitions, the 
complex phenomenal concept strategy can explain another “problem intuition” constitutive 
of the meta-problem, namely, the explanatory or metaphysical intuition - the pervasive 
judgment that it is simply not possible to explain phenomenal properties in terms of other 
kind of properties, including, especially, physical properties. Or so we’ll now argue. 
 
4. Explaining the Explanatory or Metaphysical Intuition 
We’ve suggested that phenomenal concepts like PAIN could be complex demonstratives 
like THAT BIOLOGICAL STATE. Our motivation for including the concept 
BIOLOGICAL was to illustrate how complex phenomenal concepts could help explain 
certain modal intuitions. However, that discussion used BIOLOGICAL as a kind of 
 
11 Though we suspect that Chalmers would be open to admitting as much. As he writes, “It may be 
that some other feature of phenomenal concepts can both explain our problem intuitions and be 
explained in physical terms, but if so it is this feature that will be doing the explanatory work” (22). 
On the view we’re floating, the “physical-descriptive content” we suggest is encoded by complex 
demonstratives is that “other” feature doing the work.  
12 See Lepore and Johnson (2003).  
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placeholder for whatever concept would allow a proponent of such a view to explain 
everything that needs explaining. This approach shows only that Chalmers’s complaint that 
“indexical” strategies are too thin does not apply to every version of the phenomenal 
concept strategy. We can "fatten up" phenomenal demonstrative concepts by making them 
complex. 
But modal intuitions aren’t the only intuitions that need explaining. The 
widespread metaphysical intuition that phenomenal properties can’t be explained in terms 
of physical properties also needs explaining. This suggests that one candidate concept to 
consider slotting into complex phenomenal concepts is something like NON-
PHYSICAL. Perhaps the phenomenal concept PAIN is something like the complex 
demonstrative concept THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE.13 
If so, reflecting on a reductive thesis like that the experience of pain is the experience 
of one’s c-fibers firing involves using the phenomenal concept THAT NON-PHYSICAL 
STATE and the physical concept C-FIBERS FIRING. Because the former concept is 
constituted such that it cannot easily be applied to the same kind of entity as the latter 
concept, researchers reflecting on such a thesis are led to think that it can’t be true. Thus, 
the view that phenomenal concepts are complex demonstrative concepts promises to 
 
13 This idea is inspired by a similar suggestion that we develop in metaethics with respect to 
normative concepts. See Howard and Laskowski (forthcoming). 
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explain not only the explanatory or metaphysical intuition but also another, central part of 
the meta-problem.14 
We suspect that the proposed solution will strike many as ad hoc. But it’s harder to 
make this complaint stick than one might expect. What exactly is supposed to be ad hoc 
about the suggestion that phenomenal concepts are complex demonstrative concepts of the 
form THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE? That ordinary thinkers possess complex 
demonstrative concepts cannot be doubted: both authors are now currently ostending 
mentally with the complex-demonstrative concept THAT GREY LAPTOP. Nor can it 
be doubted that we possess complex-demonstrative concepts containing contents that are 
as theory-laden as NON-PHYSICAL. We possess all sorts of concepts that are theory-
laden, like the folk-physical concept ATOM, which for many, seems to encode something 
like the theory-laden (and mistaken) concept INDIVISIBLE.  
Nevertheless, we can see why someone might think that there must be something ad 
hoc about including NON-PHYSICAL, in particular, as a constituent of a phenomenal 
concept. In the context of a debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness, it’s easy 
to imagine the possible metaphysical implications of building NON-PHYSICAL into 
 
14 We billed our explanation of the intuition that phenomenal properties can’t be explained in terms 
of physical properties as a version of the phenomenal concept strategy. Crucial to this strategy is the 
claim that phenomenal properties are identical to physical properties. However, if the concept PAIN 
is the concept THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE, it seems to follow that it is a priori false that 
what it is like to experience being in a state of pain is just being in a state in which one’s c-fibers are 
firing. Consequently, it might seem that our solution to the meta-problem of consciousness conflicts 
with the core metaphysical pillar of the phenomenal concept strategy. 
  There are several replies to this objection. First, it is available to us to follow Boghossian (1996) 
in distinguishing metaphysical from epistemic analyticity, or, roughly, the metaphysical idea of truth 
in virtue of meaning and the rather different idea of being disposed to accept a sentence in virtue of 
one’s semantic competence and pro tanto justified in doing so. If we reject the former and accept 
the latter, as some have suggested, then the truth or falsity of ‘pain is c-fibers firing’ does not depend 
on its constituent concepts, i.e., it does not depend on our proposed constituent, THAT NON-
PHYSICAL STATE. Thus, it would not be a priori false (because not metaphysically analytically 
false) that pain is c-fibers firing. Moreover, on the epistemic reading, being semantically competent 
with PAIN would consist in being disposed to accept that pain is non-physical and hence reject that 
pain can be explained physically, which is precisely the phenomenon of the ‘meta-problem’.  
Second, there are several ways (see, inter alia, Del Pinal (2018)) of making the claim that while 
THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE is semantically associated with the concept PAIN, it doesn’t 
play a role in fixing reference. For example, Recanati (2010) argues that ‘lion’ means the same thing 
in an utterance of “There is a lion on the savannah” as it does in an utterance of “There is a lion in 
the piazza”, even if the latter refers to and is made true by a lion statue. If that is true, and it’s also 
true, as it seems to us, that “lions are mammals” is analytic, then that analytic content does not 
constrain the reference of "lion", since it can refer to a statue. Thus, it could still be true that pain is 
c-fibers firing yet THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE is semantically associated with PAIN. While 
other paths are also available, our point is just that there is much more required to establish that our 
solution to the meta-problem is inconsistent with the phenomenal concept strategy. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for inviting us to consider this challenge, which we hope to explore further in 
the space allowed by future work.   
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phenomenal concepts. Recall, however, that we’re following Chalmers in maintaining that 
the debate with which we’re engaged concerning the meta-problem is principally a debate 
about our psychology, not about metaphysics. So, metaphysical implications are only 
indirectly relevant. Finally, we’ll add that including NON-PHYSICAL in some 
phenomenal concepts is justified by its clear theoretical payoffs.  
Consider a second objection. In the context of explaining our modal intuitions, we 
suggested, following Levin, that phenomenal concepts like PAIN might be complex 
demonstrative concepts of the form THAT BIOLOGICAL STATE. Doing so seemed 
to limit the content of the concept enough to allow zombie worlds, but not limit it so much 
that we could also conceive of agonized rocks. Because the inclusion of BIOLOGICAL 
helped explain the latter bit, swapping in NON-PHYSICAL for BIOLOGICAL might 
allow us to explain the explanatory or metaphysical intuition, but only at the cost of no 
longer allowing us to explain the full range of our modal intuitions. This is one step 
forward, one step right back. 
We agree with the spirit of this complaint. The name of the game is, as we’ve said, to 
find a “Goldilocks” complex demonstrative concept that helps explain everything about the 
meta-problem of consciousness that needs explaining. While THAT NON-PHYSICAL 
STATE might not do the trick, something like THAT NON-PHYSICAL STATE OF 
A NEUROLOGICALLY COMPLEX BEING might. In any case, we don’t mean to 
defend a particular version of the complex-demonstrative, phenomenal concept strategy. 
Our aim is much less ambitious; it is simply to show how this style of explanation might 
explain the meta-problem. We take ourselves to have succeeded in this modest regard. 
 
5. Conclusion 
At a very high level of abstraction, we think the problem facing phenomenal concept 
strategists is a very old one. The most general form of the problem is the question of how 
to characterize the criterion of application for certain singular referring terms like, plausibly, 
some names and demonstratives. This problem has a distinguished pedigree. On the way 
to formulating the ill-fated Axiom V, Frege offered and rejected ‘Hume’s Principle’ as a 
definition of number. According to it, roughly, the number of the members of F is the 
same as the number of members of G just in case there is a bijection between the members 
of F and the members of G. Hume’s principle offers what has come to be called a criterion 
of identity for numbers: the number of two concepts is identical just in case there is a 
bijection between them. But Hume’s Principle doesn't tell us something essential to the 
concept of number: it doesn't tell us what entity the concept denotes; it doesn't offer us 
10 
 
what has come to be called a criterion of application for the concept. As a particular example 
Frege raises in section 56 of the Grundlagen, because the Principle doesn't offer a criterion 
on what the concept of number denotes, it leaves open a question the answer to which 
everyone who grasps the concept of number knows, namely, that Julius Caesar is not a 
number. Because Frege wanted to reduce arithmetical knowledge to logical knowledge, 
and because everyone knows that Julius Caesar is not a number, then Hume’s Principle’s 
lack of a criterion of application made it an insufficiently rich logical basis by which to 
explain arithmetical knowledge. Frege’s conception of zero does not explain why, say, Julius 
Caesar is not the number zero. 
What’s striking about Frege’s own objection to the use of Hume’s Principle in his 
logicist project is what Frege presupposes about our grasp of the concept of a number. 
Frege takes it for granted that ZERO is at least partially constrained such that, analytically, 
it does not apply to Julius Caesar. That is, far from regarding it as controversial that ZERO 
implied such a constraint on its extension, Frege took it as a basic explanandum to be 
explained by any eligible account of arithmetical knowledge. But, presumably, the content 
associated with ZERO that underlies a priori knowledge that Julius Caesar is not the 
number zero only partially constrains ZERO’s reference. Phenomenal concept strategists 
face the same problem of explaining how we can know that rocks don’t feel pain in a way 
that leaves open certain possibilities we know to be open, such as the possibility of zombie 
worlds. We take complex demonstratives to offer a way forward here, at least as regards 
phenomenal concepts like PAIN.15 
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